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Abstract. This paper discusses the dynamics of Transaction Cost (TC)
in Industrial Symbiosis Institutions (ISI) and provides a fair and stable
mechanism for TC allocation among the involved firms in a given ISI. In
principle, industrial symbiosis, as an implementation of the circular econ-
omy paradigm in the context of industrial relation, is a practice aiming at
reducing the material/energy footprint of the firm. The well-engineered
form of this practice is proved to decrease the transaction costs at a collec-
tive level. This can be achieved using information systems for: identify-
ing potential synergies, evaluating mutually beneficial ones, implement-
ing the contracts, and governing the behavior of the established relations.
Then the question is “how to distribute the costs for maintaining such an infor-
mation system in a fair and stable manner?” We see such a cost as a collective
transaction cost and employ an integrated method rooted in cooperative
game theory and multiagent systems research to develop a fair and stable
allocation mechanism for it. The novelty is twofold: in developing analyt-
ical multiagent methods for capturing the dynamics of transaction costs
in industrial symbiosis and in presenting a novel game-theoretic mecha-
nism for its allocation in industrial symbiosis institutions. While the for-
mer contributes to the theories of industrial symbiosis (methodological
contribution), the latter supports decision makers aiming to specify fair
and stable industrial symbiosis contracts (practical contribution).
Keywords: Multiagent Systems · Applied AI · Computational Economics
· Practical Applications of Multiagent Techniques · Circular Economy ·
Industrial Symbiosis.
1 Introduction
Industrial symbiosis is a transitional business model to shift from linear econ-
omy paradigms towards implementing the concept of circular economy—in
the context of industrial relations/networks. In principle, the aim is to facilitate
the circulation of reusable resources among the network members [9,20]. Re-
alizing such a form of collaboration requires methods for identifying potential
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matches [19], evaluating them to generate mutually beneficial instances [50],
implementing the cost-sharing schemes in bilateral contracts [48], and decen-
tralized governance of the established relations [49]. As elaborated in [51] prob-
lematic situations occur when we move from bilateral relations to multilateral
forms in multiagent industrial symbiosis. Dealing with such problems requires:
(1) developing practical methods able to capture collective-level concepts, such
as collectively realized transaction costs, (2) practice-oriented semantics to rea-
son about the link between individual (firm-level) concerns and the collective
(institution-level) attributes, and (3) implementable mechanisms to guarantee
desirable collective attributes with no harm to firm-level concerns. This work
aims to address this gap by focusing on the nature of collective transaction costs
in industrial symbiosis and developing a contextualized allocation mechanism
that guarantees game-theoretical fairness and stability properties.
1.1 Conceptual Analysis: On the Nature and Dynamics of TC in IS
As originally introduced by [44], Transaction Costs (TC) play a key role in the
establishment and stability of different forms of contractual relations. This is
also the case for industrial symbiosis relations, both in bilateral and multi-
lateral forms. For instance, when an industrial cluster manager aims to share
the collective costs for maintaining the shared environments among the clus-
ter members, she should take into account the firm-level concerns. One general
approach is to see the contribution of each firm to the collective as a measure
for making such cost/benefit allocation decisions [4]. In the case of IS, while
we have such contribution-aware tools for allocating costs in bilateral IS rela-
tions [48], they fail to guarantee some basic properties such as collective ratio-
nality (related to whether firms have any incentive to leave the collaboration)
on a multilateral network level [51]. In practice, such a disadvantage results
in inefficient deployment of an IS management platform in real-life industrial
symbiosis networks.
To develop an efficient technique for dealing with this problem, it is crucial
to understand the context and see what are transaction costs in IS. In multi-
agent industrial symbiosis, the main elements that contribute to the transac-
tion cost are costs involved in market/partner searching, negotiation costs, and
the relation enforcement cost [17,8]. We argue that in modern industrial sym-
biosis, and thanks to (online) IS information systems/platforms, the total IS
transaction cost boils down to costs for establishment and maintenance of the
information system which is responsible for handling the searching/matching
process, for supporting/automating the negotiations, and for synthesizing the
required enforcement measures. Then the question is about finding methods to
distribute this total cost among the involved firms, such that it would be fair
with respect to each firm’s contribution. That means that, after a basic payment
for getting involved in a platform, firms that may gain more in a given network,
are expected to pay more for upcoming transaction costs. In other words: “with
more power comes more responsibility”. This perspective supports the so called
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fairness notions—proposed in cooperative game theory—that agents’ individ-
ual benefit/cost share oughts to reflect their contribution to the collective ben-
efit/cost [14,52]. While the idea to take into account each agent’s contribution
provides a basis for allocating the costs in multiagent industrial symbiosis, we
lack methods for defining the value of each and every coalition of firms, in-
volved in the network3. Such an input is crucial for applying standard fair al-
location mechanisms (e.g., the notion of the Shapley value [35]). In response,
developing a method that characterizes IS as a game is the first objective of this
work. The result of this first step will be a game-form that in turn enables the
application of game theoretic solution concepts for allocating the transaction
cost. Technical details will follow in Section 2.
To formulate a realistic game, based on which the transaction cost can be
allocated, one question that is crucial to address is “what is the nature of trans-
action cost in IS practices?”. In the IS literature [17,50], costs for operationalizing
IS are categorized as costs for transporting the resource, for treating them by
means of recycling/preparation processes, and finally transaction costs as dis-
cussed above. In principle, transportation and treatment costs are based on the
realization of physical facts and interactions4. For instance, the physical dis-
tance between the firms is one of the key measures that determines the trans-
portation cost and hence can be a fair basis for allocating the collective trans-
portation cost among the involved firms (e.g., see [42]). For treatment costs—
as the total cost that results from recycling, drying, and categorizing—we also
have physical processes that consume resources (e.g., electricity and diesel cost
of a recycling plant). However, the transaction cost is not based on physical
facts, but mainly is the aggregation of costs of institutional acts, e.g., negoti-
ation costs and corresponding costs for establishing monitoring/enforcement
mechanisms. These acts are on the one hand required to enable or keep track of
physical processes (hence have a physical connotation) and on the other hand
are related to the structure of interfirm connections (hence have an institu-
tional nature). Therefore, it would be reasonable to consider a form of dual-
nature physical-institutional IS value as a basis for allocating the collective trans-
action cost among the involved firms. This way of capturing the institutional
dimension of the transaction cost is in-line with the original studies on this
3 In the game-theoretic language, the characteristic function of the cooperative multia-
gent industrial symbiosis is not well-defined with respect to the context of industrial
symbiosis and its constraints.
4 To reason about the essence of transaction costs, we use the terminology of [34] and
form our perspective based on the categorization of physical and institutional facts and
their corresponding acts. In brief, physical facts are about the valuation of a variable
in the observable world (e.g., the quantity of a resource or the distance between two
firms) while institutional facts are about the invisible world of concepts, definable in
a given context (e.g., the fact that a resource is needed or that a firm is powerful). In turn,
physical acts may change the value of physical facts while institutional acts affect
the institutional facts. We abstract from the reasoning structures that relate the two
disjoint sets of facts/acts. See [49] for further elaborations on such a conceptualization
in the context of industrial symbiosis.
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notion, as presented in [45,44,40]. Although the line of reasoning is straightfor-
ward, capturing such a perspective in a practical tool for allocating the collec-
tive transaction costs in multiagent industrial symbiosis is an open problem5.
Next, we elaborate on our approach on tailoring formal multiagent methodolo-
gies [46,13] for modeling industrial symbiosis as an institution and for devel-
oping an operationally feasible transaction cost allocation mechanism.
1.2 Institutional Approach: On How to Address the Problem
We see multiagent industrial symbiosis as a practical manifestation of (well-
designed) industrial institutions and aim to model it using game-theoretic meth-
ods, able to capture both the physical and the institutional contributions of
involved firms6. Such a formal approach enables employing institutional eco-
nomics methods for guaranteeing desirable properties at the collective level,
e.g., see [51] for how a regulatory agent can influence the feasibility of multia-
gent industrial symbiosis by means of incentive engineering techniques.
In relation to the focus of this work, i.e., the collective transaction cost and
its allocation among the involved firms, the fairness property is concerned with
capturing the contributions of firms as a basis for cost allocation. While physi-
cal acts/facts (e.g., distance and quantifiable used energy) determine a base for
computing fair allocation of (physical) transportation/treatment costs, a fair al-
location of the collective transaction cost calls for a notion to capture the institu-
tional contribution of agents as well. To that end, we provide a formal account
of the transaction cost economics in industrial symbiosis (based on computa-
tional organization theory and industrial institutions). This results in the intro-
duction of the notion of industrial symbiosis index as a measure for capturing the
physical and institutional contribution of firms. In turn, this notion will be a
base for developing a fair and stable transaction cost allocation mechanism—
rooted in the literature on fair division mechanisms [43,31]. Finally, we elab-
orate on potential questions to be solved using the provided methodological
foundation.
2 Modeling Multiagent Industrial Symbiosis Institutions
To model IS institutions, we build upon a graphical representation of coopera-
tive games—also known as graphical games [22] or graph-restricted games [28].
5 As highlighted by [51], some standard allocation mechanisms are inapplicable for IS
implementation due to operational complexities—embedded in real-life multiagent
industrial relations.
6 We use the term institution as a general reference to a collective of entities behaving
in a systematic manner, under an emerged or established coordination mechanism.
Then a well-designed institution is one in which the mechanism is engineered such
that some (collectively desirable) properties hold [33]. This would be distinguishable
from the stronger notion of organization where we have an explicit representation of
roles, organizational goals/preferences, organizational structures, and interaction proto-
cols [2,6].
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Such a representation is a natural choice as it reflects the established relations
among the firms and allows the application of standard fair division methods
for sharing the collective transaction cost, among the members of the institu-
tion7. As a first step, we use graph-theoretic notions to determine a realistic
characteristic function for the game-theoretic representation of industrial sym-
biosis. Then, adding an allocation mechanism results in our formal notion of
industrial symbiosis institution.
2.1 Preliminary Notions and Definitions
We recall basic game theoretic notions and the definition of graphical games
based on [25,28].
Cooperative Games: A (transferable utility) cooperative game on a finite set of
agents Γ is a tuple 〈Γ, f〉 where the game’s characteristic function f : 2Γ 7→ R
is such that f(∅) = 0.
Graphical Games: A graphical (transferable utility) cooperative game on a
finite set of agents/vertices Γ is a triple 〈Γ,W, f〉 where W is a |Γ | × |Γ | real-
valued weight matrix (representing the weights of edges between vertices in
Γ ) and the game’s W -restricted characteristic function fW : 2Γ 7→ R is such
that f(∅) = 0. We say f is restricted to W as it determines the value of any
coalition S ⊆ Γ \ ∅ with respect to W . Such a general formalization allows
further tailoring in the context of industrial symbiosis.
Allocation Mechanisms: For a given cooperative game G = 〈Γ, f〉, a (single-
point) allocation mechanismM maps a real-valued tupleM(G) ∈ R|Γ | to the
pointed game. The i-th element of the allocation tupleM(G) = 〈a1, a2, . . . , a|Γ |〉
is the share of agent i ∈ Γ according toM and with respect to G. The term share
can be interpreted—with respect to the context—as the amount to be paid or
gained by i. We later discuss various properties that such a mechanism can hold
or bring about.
2.2 From Weighted Connectivity Graphs to Cooperative Graph Games
To determine how the transaction cost can be allocated among the firms based
on their physical and institutional contributions, we take the graph that repre-
sents the established symbiotic relations and obtained cost reductions as an in-
put8. Given such a graph, we formulate a game-theoretical representation that
in turn results in inducing the physical as well as the institutional contribution
of individual firms.
7 Through the course of this work, we may refer to firms as agents—following the con-
vention in computational economics. This would be to see any industrial symbiosis
institution as an environment that supports the collaborative interaction of a set of
autonomous, rational decision-makers in charge of the involved firms.
8 Note that the reasoning about such a cost allocation takes place in a retrospective
manner and after the establishment of industrial symbiosis relations.
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Definition 1 (IS Graph). An IS graph is a tuple 〈Γ,W 〉, where Γ is the set of ver-
tices, representing |Γ | firms and W is the |Γ | × |Γ | matrix of positive real valued
weights, representing the cost reduction values. There exists a weighted undirected edge
between distinct firms i, j ∈ Γ , representing their established symbiotic relation, only
if Wi,j 6= 0. Moreover, for any i ∈ Γ we have that
∑
j∈Γ
Wi,j > 0 (connected) and that
Wi,i = 0 (loop-free).
To have a concise and contextualized representation, we don’t require an
explicit set of edges as it could be derived based on W . The same holds for
requiring the graph to be loop-free and connected. Basically, loops and discon-
nected firms can be excluded as in such cases the transaction cost (hence its
allocation) is meaningless. This results in a realistic representation in which un-
feasible relations/edges (which otherwise could be represented by negative or
zero weights) are excluded. In the context of IS, Wi,j reflects the realized net
benefit—in terms of collectively obtained cost reductions—of the symbiotic re-
lation between firms i and j on a given (quantity of) resource r. As discussed
in [50], such a collective benefit can be computed by deducing the total opera-
tional cost of the relation (for treatment and transportation of r) from the total
traditional costs (for discharging r on the provider side of the relation and pur-
chasing traditionally-used inputs—substituted by r in the realized relation—
on the receiver side). The W graph would be the basis for formulating both
the physical IS game (reflecting obtainable benefits) and the institutional game
(modeling the institutional power of firms in the cluster).
Definition 2 (Physical IS Game). A graphical physical IS game is a triple 〈Γ,W, v〉,
where G = 〈Γ,W 〉 is an IS graph and for any group of firms S ⊆ Γ with |S| > 1, the
characteristic function v(S) is equal to 12
∑
i,j∈SWi,j . By convention, for any S with
|S| ≤ 1, v(S) = 0. Then in the normalized characteristic function, denoted by v¯, we
have that v¯(S) = v(S)/v(Γ ).
Example 1. To demonstrate the applicability of our approach, we use a case
study (adopted from a realistic industrial cluster9). See Figure 1 for an illus-
tration of the IS graph. In this graph, the value on each edge reflects the benefit
(in terms of cost reductions) that resulted from the symbiotic relation, realized
between the nodes that it connects. While such values represent the physical
dimension of an IS practice, the structure of the graph is what we later use to
formulate the institutional importance of each node/firm.
The value of any singleton or empty coalition is 0 while for any S with
|S| > 1, we calculate the value by simply adding up the weights of the edges
that connect any two member of S. For instance, v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 22 and v(Γ =
{1, . . . , 6}) = 34. For the same coalitions, the normalized values are respectively
22
34 and
34
34 . These normalized values will be later employed for aggregation of
9 The adopted case is one of the successful implementations of industrial symbiosis
networks, investigated in the a European project. Due to confidentiality concerns, we
omitted the company names and modified some values.
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Fig. 1. Connectivity graph of the involved firms in the IS cluster. Each node represents a
firm and the value on each edge represents the amount of cost reduction, obtained as a
result of the collaboration between the firms that the edge connects. Values are presented
as utils. A util can be interpreted as any form of transferable utility, e.g., a util may be
equal to 100$.
the physical game with a game that represents the institutional power of firms
in such clusters.
Below, we present game theoretic properties of the physical IS games.
Proposition 1 (Properties). Let G = 〈Γ,W, v〉 be a physical IS game. Then:
(1) for any coalitions S ⊂ T , we have that v(S) ≤ v(T ) (monotonicity).
(2) for any disjoint coalitions S and T , we have that v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) (super-
additivity).
(3) for any coalitions S and T , we have that v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )
(convexity/super-modularity).
Proof. (1) imagine a firm i in T \ S. If i is connected to a member of S or T \ S,
it contributes to the value of T . Otherwise, it has the added value of 0. In both
cases, part (1) is true. (2) if there exist a direct edge connecting a member of S
to a member of the disjoint coalition T , then v(S ∪ T ) increases; otherwise, it is
equal to v(S)+v(T ), thanks to non-negative weights. (3) In case the two sets are
disjoint, it follows from part (2). Otherwise, the two coalitions have nonempty
intersection with either positive or zero value. uunionsq
These properties result in the following practical result that the collective
value of the grand coalition Γ can be shared among the firms such that no
coalition has an incentive to defect the collaboration.
Theorem 1 (Nonempty Core). Let G = 〈Γ,W, v〉 be a physical IS game. Then there
exists an allocation mechanismM such that inM(G) = 〈a1, a2, . . . , a|Γ |〉, we have
(1)
∑
i∈Γ
ai = v(Γ ) (Efficiency) and (2) for any S ⊆ Γ ,
∑
i∈S
ai ≥ v(S) (Coalitional
Rationality).
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Proof. The two clauses in this theorem axiomatize the notion of core-nonemptiness [37].
Then, the convexity property (in Proposition 1) in combination with the well-
established Bondareva-Shapley theorem [5,36] ensures the nonemptiness of the
core, and accordingly the existence of a mechanism to generate the allocation.
uunionsq
2.3 From Cooperative Games to Multiagent Industrial Institutions
In addition to the physical game—based on which we can induce the phys-
ical contributions that firms can bring about through a bilateral exchange of
resources—the next step is to present a basis for capturing the institutional con-
tribution of firms. For such a purpose, we cannot rely on cost reduction values
(obtained thanks to operationalizing the relations) basically because transaction
costs are non-operational, but have an institutional nature. To that end, we em-
ploy the notion of closeness centrality adopted from the literature on communi-
cation networks [3] to capture the institutional power of firms, and as the basis
for defining the characteristic function of the IS institutional game. In a graph on
the set of vertices Γ , the closeness centrality of a vertex i ∈ Γ , denoted by C(i),
is equal to |Γ |−1∑
j∈Γ\{i}
d(i,j) where the distance function d : Γ × Γ 7→ N+ returns the
shortest distance between i and j. More explicitly, d(i, j) = d(j, i) returns the
minimum number of edges passed to reach j from i. Recalling the presented
IS graph in Figure 1, we have that C(1) = 57 , C(2) = C(3) =
5
8 , C(4) =
5
5 , and
C(5) = C(6) = 59 .
Then based on this notions, we formulate the institutional IS game as fol-
lows.
Definition 3 (Institutional IS Game). A graphical institutional IS game is a triple
〈Γ,W, ι〉, where G = 〈Γ,W 〉 is an IS graph and for any group of firms S ⊆ Γ with
|S| > 0, the characteristic function ι(S) is equal to∑i∈S C(i). By convention, ι(∅) =
0. Then in the normalized characteristic function, denoted by ι¯, we have that ι¯(S) =
ι(S)/ι(Γ ).
Due to the additive formulation of ι, we have the following properties for
institutional IS games.
Proposition 2 (Properties). Let G = 〈Γ,W, ι〉 be an institutional IS game. Then G
is (1) monotonic and (2) convex/super-modular (defined analogously to Proposition 1).
Proof. Given that C(i) is non-negative for all i ∈ Γ and the formulation of ι(S)
as the summation of C(i) for all i ∈ S, monotonicity is trivial. For convexity, it
suffices to decompose ι(S ∪T ). We have that ι(S ∪T ) is equal to∑i∈S∪T C(i) =∑
j∈S C(j) +
∑
k∈T C(k)−
∑
l∈S∩T C(l), hence ι(S ∪T ) + ι(S ∩T ) = ι(S) + ι(T ),
which satisfies the convexity condition. uunionsq
Immediate to this, we have the existence of an efficient and coalitionally ra-
tional allocation mechanism for any institutional IS game (parallel to Theorem
1 for physical IS games).
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Having both the physical and the institutional aspects of IS formalized in the
game-theoretic language, we present the aggregated IS game as the summation
of the normalized form of the two games.
Definition 4 (IS Game). Let G = 〈Γ,W 〉 be an IS graph, GP = 〈Γ,W, v〉 a physical
IS game on G, and GI = 〈Γ,W, ι〉 an institutional IS game on G. Then the graphical
IS game is a triple 〈Γ,W, σ〉, such that for any group of firms S ⊆ Γ , the characteristic
function σ(S) is equal to v¯(S) + ι¯(S).
Then, as a corollary to Propositions 1 and 2 and Theorem 1, we immediately
deduce that any IS game preserves the properties presented in Proposition 2,
hence has a non-empty core (analogous to Theorem 1).
Corollary 1. For any IS game 〈Γ,W, σ〉, the set of efficient and coalitionally rational
allocation mechanisms is non-empty.
In other words: the normalized versions of both games satisfy the presented
properties and linear aggregation preserves them. In some application domains,
one may opt for various forms of linear aggregations, i.e., to employ σ = αv¯+βι¯
(for integer-valued positive α and β). We later highlight that due to the linearity
of the allocation mechanism that we employ, our results remain valid in such a
generalization of the problem.
Following the presented perspective in [50], an industrial symbiosis institu-
tion consists of a group of firms, a structure that specifies the outcome of col-
laboration among potential coalitions (in the group), and mechanism(s) respon-
sible for coordinating the institution. Such mechanisms are basically in charge
to guarantee some desirable properties in the institution. In our case—in in-
dustrial symbiosis institutions—the aim could be to ensure the stability of the
institution (i.e., that no firm or group of firms has an incentive to defect the col-
laboratively profitable institution), the fair allocation of the collectively obtained
benefits (such that the contribution of firms is reasonably reflected in their in-
dividual shares), or ideally to bring about both fairness and stability. In a general
form, an industrial symbiosis institution is defined as:
Definition 5 (Industrial Symbiosis Institution). Let Γ be a set of firms, G an IS
game among firms in Γ , and M a set of value allocation mechanisms. Then an indus-
trial symbiosis institution is defined as triple I = 〈Γ,G,M〉.
In brief, this is to see an IS institution as an IS game under mechanisms in
charge of distributing the collective values10. This would be to distribute col-
lectively obtainable benefits as well as collective operational costs for establish-
ment and maintenance of the institution. The latter category corresponds to the
focus of this work for allocating transaction costs in industrial symbiosis. In the
next section, we present an allocation mechanism—corresponding to the notion
of Shapley value and the Myerson value in graph-restricted games [35,28]—that
satisfies both fairness and stability properties. We also elaborate on its computa-
tional complexity and tractability results.
10 Note that we do not fix the allocation mechanism but take a set M.
10 V. Yazdanpanah et al.
3 A Shapley-Based Allocation Mechanism for IS
The main idea behind the fair allocation of values is to take into account the
contribution of each agent to the collaborative group [25]. In industrial sym-
biosis management platforms, the collective transaction cost reduces to costs for
establishment and maintenance of the framework—as a dynamic e-market en-
vironment11. This calls for dynamic cost allocation methods, able to grasp the
physical as well as institutional nature of each agent’s contribution. Roughly
speaking, following an initial payment for a basic membership (to get involved
in this e-market framework) it is expected that a “fair” allocation of costs for
further improvements, takes into account the contribution of each participant—
in terms of their role/function in the formed industrial network. Having the
game-theoretic formulation of an IS game (as an aggregation of the physical
and institutional IS games), any proportion of the transaction cost that oughts
to be shared among the firms—e.g., the total cost for updating the IT platform—
can be distributed based on each firm’s contribution to the IS game. A standard
notion in computational economics, capturing the contribution of each agent
in a cooperative setting, is the Shapley value [35]. Shapley’s allocation method
uniquely satisfies the so called fairness properties, which has high relevance for
our domain of application in industrial organizations. In IS games, as a com-
bination of normalized physical and institutional games among the firms, the
Shapley value of a firm determines the extent of its power and influence in the
institution. This value would be defined as what we call the firm’s IS index.
Definition 6 (IS Index). Let G = 〈Γ,W, σ〉 be an IS game. Then for any arbitrary
i ∈ Γ , the IS index, denoted by Φi(σ), is equal to
∑
S⊆Γ\{i}
|S|!(|Γ |−|S|−1)!
|Γ |! (σ(S∪{i})−
σ(S)).
Due to the characteristics of σ (as a reflection of both the physical as well
as institutional aspects of IS) the introduced notion of IS index is a measure
that reflects the power of a firm based on its connectivity to other firms in
the network and also its operational contributions by bringing about cost re-
ductions12. This index forms a basis for allocating transaction costs such that a
higher contribution determines a higher share (i.e., “with more power comes more
responsibility”). This approach relies on the standard rationale in cooperative
cost-sharing games that agents with higher potentials ought to pay the larger
11 Note that there may exist other forms of individual transaction costs in such relations.
For instance, some investments to calibrate the production process in order to enable
accepting a waste-based resource would be categorized as a transaction cost. How-
ever, as the equipment remains property of the firm—and can be potentially used in
its further relations—it is not reasonable to consider such a cost as a collective (to be
shared) transaction cost.
12 We later show that due to the graphical representation of the problem, the IS index
can be formulated in a non-factorial manner. This results in lower computational com-
plexity for calculating the IS index of each firm.
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share of the costs in the collaborative practice [24]. Accordingly, given an exter-
nal cost function τ(Γ ) (equal to τ(S) for all S ⊆ Γ with |S| ≥ 2), determining
the (to be shared) transaction cost13 among the members of Γ , we present the
following transaction cost allocation mechanism for IS institutions.
Definition 7 (TC Allocation for IS). Let G = 〈Γ,W, σ〉 be an IS game, Φi(σ) the
corresponding IS index for any arbitrary i ∈ Γ , and τ(Γ ) a given transaction cost value
for Γ . We define the cost share of agent i ∈ Γ as Ti(σ, τ) := Φi(σ)·τ(Γ )σ(Γ ) . Allocation
T (σ, τ) = 〈a1, . . . , a|Γ |〉 with ai = Ti(σ, τ) denotes the TC allocation for IS game G
with respect to τ .
This allocation, tailored and contextualized for the specific class of struc-
tured, graph-restricted industrial symbiosis games, (1) captures both the phys-
ical as well as the institutional aspects of this practice, (2) satisfies desirable
fairness and stability properties (to be discussed in Section 3.1), and (3) is com-
putationally tractable thanks to the graphical representation of the games (to be
illustrated in Section 3.2).
3.1 On Fairness and Stability
Having an industrial institution, stability and fairness are two properties insur-
able by means of well-designed mechanisms. In the case of the transaction cost
allocation mechanism, stability is about (1) sharing the exact amount of the cost
and (2) sharing such that no firm can benefit by defecting from the institution.
On the other hand, fairness is a more complex property, concerned with (1) the
symmetric contribution of firms to the institution, (2) the share of firms whose
involvement are non-contributory, (3) the possibility to aggregate various insti-
tutions, and finally (4) the sharing of the exact total cost. Below, we provide a
formal account of these properties in axiomatic forms—based on [25]—and in-
vestigate whether they are valid in case of our suggested cost allocation mech-
anism.
Proposition 3 (Fairness Axioms). Let I = 〈Γ,G,M〉 be an industrial symbiosis
institution where Γ is the set of firms and G = 〈Γ,W, σ〉 is the IS game. For any
transaction cost τ(Γ ) > 0 we have that M = {T (σ, τ)} (Definition 7) guarantees the
following fairness axioms:
(1) The collective transaction cost is efficiently allocated among the firms, formally,∑
i∈Γ
Ti(σ, τ) = τ(Γ ) (Efficiency).
13 Such a cost may consist of initial platform development costs, ongoing IT infrastruc-
ture maintenance, or extra personnel recruitment costs for updating the platform. τ
is defined in a functional way merely to allow further extensions on dynamic formu-
lations of the transaction cost function, e.g., as a temporal function of some required
resources for maintaining an IS information system. In other words, τ(S) is undefined
for |S| ≤ 1 and is equal to a given value τ(Γ ) otherwise. Note that our main question
is on how to distribute this collectively defined value.
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(2) The identities of the firms do not affect their share of the total transaction cost,
formally, for i, j ∈ Γ , Ti(σ, τ) = Tj(σ, τ) if for all S ⊆ Γ \ {i, j} we have that
σ(S ∪ {i}) = σ(S ∪ {j}) (Symmetry).
(3) Any firm of which its contribution to any coalition is equal to its individual value,
pays a transaction cost share proportional to its individual value, formally, for i ∈
Γ , Ti(σ, τ) =
σ({i})·τ(Γ )
σ(Γ ) if for all S ⊆ Γ \ {i} we have that σ(S ∪ {i}) =
σ(S) + σ({i})(Dummy Player).
(4) For two IS games, an agent’s transaction cost share in the aggregated game is equal
to the summation of its share in each, formally, given an industrial game G′ =
〈Γ,W ′, σ′〉 and a corresponding transaction cost τ ′(Γ ) > 0, we have that Ti(σ +
σ′, τ + τ ′) = Ti(σ, τ) + Ti(σ′, τ ′) (Additivity).
Proof. Our notion of IS index measures the Shapley value of each firm i. Fol-
lowing the linearity of this Shapley-based value, we have that the allocation
mechanism preserves all the four properties that the Shapley value uniquely
possesses [21]. uunionsq
In general, fairness and stability are orthogonal. In other words, an alloca-
tion might be fair but not stable or the other way around. Below, we present an
axiomatic account of stability and show their validity for the presented trans-
action cost allocation method.
Proposition 4 (Stability Axioms). Let I = 〈Γ,G,M〉 be an industrial symbiosis
institution where Γ is the set of firms and G = 〈Γ,W, σ〉 is the IS game. For any
transaction cost τ(Γ ) > 0 we have that M = {T (σ, τ)} (Definition 7) guarantees the
following stability axioms:
(1) The collective transaction cost is efficiently allocated among the firms, formally,∑
i∈Γ
Ti(σ, τ) = τ(Γ ) (Efficiency).
(2) No subgroup faces an economic incentive to deviate from the grand coalition and
benefit by paying a lower share of the transaction cost, formally, for any coalition
S ⊆ Γ with |S| ≥ 2, we have that ∑
i∈S
Ti(σ, τ) ≤ τ(S) (Coalitional Rationality).
Proof. The first part is valid (using the previous proposition). For the second
part, the current formulation of the collective transaction cost requires that
τ(S) = τ(Γ ) which if combined with the first clause, immediately satisfies the
claim14. uunionsq
Thanks to the adoption of a Shapley-based index—and its linearity property—
the fairness and stability properties will be preserved in the presented aggre-
gated form of IS institutions and any general linear aggregation forms in which
the importance of the physical and institutional contributions are weighted.
14 In the generalized form, where the transaction cost function is defined for all poten-
tial coalitions, the convexity of τ would be required for coalitional rationality. Note
that in case such a function is available, the mere problem on “how to distribute the
collective cost among the firms” will evaporate, as its solution requires a single call to
this function.
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Theorem 2 (Generalizability). Let I = 〈Γ,G,M〉 be an industrial symbiosis in-
stitution where σ = αv¯ + βι¯ is the characteristic function of G in terms of v and ι,
the corresponding characteristic functions in the physical and institutional IS games,
respectively. We have that M = {T (σ, τ)} (Definition 7) guarantees fairness and sta-
bility in I.
3.2 Reductions and a Tractable Algorithm
Although the presented Shapley-based IS index has the above-mentioned de-
sirable properties, its standard formulation leads to computationally expensive
algorithms. Below, we present reductions that result in an alternative formula-
tion for computing the IS index.
Lemma 1. In a graphical physical IS game GP = 〈Γ,W, v〉, for any i ∈ Γ we have
that
∑
S⊆Γ\{i}
|S|!(|Γ |−|S|−1)!
|Γ |! (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) =
∑
j∈Γ\{i}
Wi,j
2 .
Proof. Based on the formulation of v, we have that the value of any singleton
coalition S is zero and for any coalition T with more than two members, the
value is computed based on the summation of values that bilateral relations
(established within T ) bring about. In other words, the average marginal con-
tribution of any firm to any T with more than two members is zero. The only
set of coalitions to which a firm may have a contribution are two-member coali-
tions for which we have the results of [48] that the middle point of the core cor-
responds to the average marginal contribution. In our graph-restricted games,
this value is equal to the Myerson value [28] and is equal to half of the summa-
tion of the values on the edges that are directly connected to i, i.e.,
∑
j∈Γ\{i}
Wi,j
2 .
uunionsq
Next, we present a reduction for computing the contributions in the institu-
tional game.
Lemma 2. In a graphical institutional IS game GI = 〈Γ,W, ι〉, for any i ∈ Γ we have
that
∑
S⊆Γ\{i}
|S|!(|Γ |−|S|−1)!
|Γ |! (ι(S ∪ {i})− ι(S)) = C(i).
Proof. In the institutional game, each firm i’s contribution to any coalition is
equal to its degree of closeness centrality. Then the dummy player property
implies the claim. uunionsq
Based on these reductions we have that the transaction cost allocation is
computationally tractable.
Theorem 3. Let I = 〈Γ,G,M〉 be an industrial symbiosis institution where Γ is
the set of firms and G = 〈Γ,W, σ〉 is the IS game. For any transaction cost τ(Γ ) >
0, employing M = {T (σ, τ)} to compute the allocation T (σ, τ) = 〈a1, . . . , a|Γ |〉 is
polynomial in time and space.
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Algorithm 1: TC Cost Allocation in IS
Input : IS Graph G = 〈Γ,W 〉with Γ as the indexed set of firms and W as the
|Γ | × |Γ |weight matrix, Transaction Cost τ(Γ ).
1 % Initialization
2 n← |Γ |
3 Sum(G)← 1
2
∑
i,j∈Γ
Wi,j
4 Cent(G)← ∑
i∈Γ
C(i)
5 T ← [T1, . . . , Tn] % n-Member Allocation Array
6 % Allocation
7 for i ∈ Γ do
8 Sum(i)← 0
9 for j ∈ Γ \ {i} do
10 Sum(i)← Sum(i) + Wi,j
2
11 end
12 % Compute IS Index Φi(σ)
13 Φi(v¯)← Sum(i)Sum(G)
14 Φi(ι¯)← C(i)Cent(G)
15 Φi(σ)← Φi(v¯) + Φi(ι¯)
16 % Compute Individual Transaction Cost Ti(σ, τ)
17 Ti(σ, τ)← Φi(σ)·τ(Γ )2
18 T [i]← Ti(σ, τ)
19 end
20 return T
Proof. We present a constructive proof by providing an algorithm (see Algo-
rithm 1) that generates the allocation, of which we verify its correctness and
subsequently prove the complexity claims.
Correctness: In Algorithm 1, we have that for each firm i ∈ Γ , the IS index
Φi(σ) is equal to the Shapley value of i in the aggregated game (of the normal-
ized physical and institutional games). Thanks to the additivity property, this
would be equal to the aggregation of Shapley values in each game. Then, we
rely on Lemma 1 and 2 for calculating the two values. Finally, for computing
individual transaction costs, we have that σ(Γ ) = 2 as it is equal to v(Γ )v(Γ ) +
ι(Γ )
ι(Γ ) .
Space Complexity: The required matrix of weights (representing the set of ob-
tained cost reductions) is in O(n2) where n is the size of Γ . Time Complexity: For
computing the IS indices, we have O(n) on the big loop. Then in the physical
game component, Sum(i) is in O(n) (a pass on the i-th row in W ) and Sum(G)
is in O(n2) (a pass through the whole W ). For the institutional part, we have
that computing C(i) is reducible to finding the shortest paths [15] which is well-
known to be in O(n3) [16]. uunionsq
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4 Method Application in a Case Study
To show the applicability of the developed method for allocating collective
transaction costs among a cluster of firms Γ , we use the presented case in Exam-
ple 1 and assume a total value τ(Γ ) as the collective transaction cost, realized
for an updating round in Γ ’s industrial symbiosis information system. Assum-
ing τ(Γ ) = 100 simply results in percentage calculation for individual shares.
Following the steps in Algorithm 1, we have that Sum(G) = 34 andCent(G) =
1027
252 . Then for each firm i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, to compute Φi(v¯) (as the physical com-
ponent of Φi(σ)), we calculate the summation of the weights on all the edges
connected to i and divide it by Sum(G). Thus we have: Φ1(v¯) = 734 , Φ2(v¯) =
3
34 ,
Φ3(v¯) =
4
34 , Φ4(v¯) =
14
34 , Φ5(v¯) =
2
34 , Φ6(v¯) =
4
34 . For each firm i, adding
C(i)
Cent(G)
to Φi(v¯) results in its IS index Φi(σ) = 1330934918 ,
4218
17459 ,
9463
34918 ,
11473
17459 ,
3407
17459 ,
4434
17459 (re-
spectively for firms 1 to 6). Finally, the transaction cost allocation T could be
generated based on Φi(σ). We have that: T1(σ, τ) = 19.06, T2(σ, τ) = 12.08,
T3(σ, τ) = 13.55, T4(σ, τ) = 32.86, T5(σ, τ) = 9.76, and T6(σ, τ) = 12.70.
Note that as we employ generic graph-/game-theoretical solution concepts
as a basis for the developed algorithm, our results are neither sensitive to the
distribution of the cost reduction values nor to the structure of the connectivity
graph.
5 Conclusions and Open Research Directions
Amid the institutional nature of transaction costs, to our knowledge, this work
is the first proposal that translates Searle’s well-established philosophy on in-
stitutional theory for the context of IS, takes it into practice for fair transaction
cost allocation, and introduces a tractable algorithm for such a purpose. As a
managerial decision support tool, the presented algorithm can be integrated
into smart IS contracting and management frameworks to enable the automa-
tion of cost allocation procedures. For instance, as a suggested business model
for IS clusters, firms would be expected to pay an initial membership fee and
then be charged for further collective transaction costs based on the presented
method—reflecting their operational as well as institutional contributions.
As presented, this work has immediate applicability to support IS manage-
ment by means of providing a fair and stable TC allocation mechanism. In ad-
dition, it opens new research directions to study: different IS classes, various
forms of TC functions, applicable notions of fairness and toolbox of mechanisms,
and governance mechanisms able to observe the collective behavior of IS.
IS Classes and Graphical Constraints: While we focused on generic IS, an in-
teresting line of research is to investigate sub-classes of IS with respect to their
graphical structures. For instance, in most bio-based IS practices, bio-refineries
are in the center of the cluster due to their crucial role as a resource treat-
ment/recycling facility. This results in tree-like structures or in clusters of star
graphs such that no two firms can implement an IS relation in the absence of
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a third-party refinery. This calls for tailored methods able to capture such con-
textual properties. To this end, a combination of tree-like graphical games [29]
and dependence graphs [10] would be a suggested formal foundation.
Transaction Cost Functions: An immediate extension to this work is to study
transaction cost functions, formulated in terms of the operational dimensions
of IS (see [50] for such dimensions). This results in cases where—in addition
to the grand coalition—the collective transaction cost for some (but not all the)
other coalitions is well-defined, through a functional formulation of TC; e.g.,
using the presented multiagent methods in [30]. In such a case, we see that
satisfying the coalitional rationality, by means of an allocation mechanism, calls
for integrating the properties of such a function and requiring circumscriptions
on the characteristic functions of the physical and institutional IS games.
Notions of Fairness and Toolbox of Mechanisms: We plan to relate the presented
Shapley-based fair allocation to other axiomatic notions of fairness [23,32]. This
results in a toolbox of mechanisms, each satisfying a set of desirable proper-
ties, hence admissible in a related domain of application. In practice, imple-
menting such a mechanism toolbox in IS information systems enables the firm
managers to opt for a relevant set of decision support services, tailored with
respect to their managerial strategies and preferences. To compare the effec-
tiveness of mechanisms in different domains, an appropriate approach would
be to employ agent-based simulation techniques [18,47] in combination with
participatory policy analysis tools [27,26].
Norm-Aware IS Governance: Finally, a line of focus for future work is to de-
velop governance frameworks for IS. This is to enable monitoring of the orga-
nizational behavior and enforcing normatively desirable behaviors. For such a
purpose, we rely on the rich literature on norm-aware coordination [41,12,39]
and address open problems related to organizational characterization [11] of mul-
tiagent industrial symbiosis. To that end, cost allocation and incentive engi-
neering techniques can be employed as a financial instrument for nudging the
collective behavior and to ensure the compliance of firms to contractual com-
mitments [1,7].
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